EPS Blog

Abstract: In a recent article, Rebecca Merrill Groothuis argues that the complementarian distinction that woman is equal in value with man yet subordinate role is logically incoherent. While acknowledging that a merely functional subordination would allow for personal equality, she argues that woman’s subordination is not merely functional but is grounded in her essential being as female, and thus necessarily entails her inferiority in value to man. In this paper, I argue, first, that Groothuis fails to show that woman’s subordination is essential rather than merely functional, and second, that even if it were essential if would not entail woman’s inferiority in value.

Abstract: In his Philosophia Christi article (6:1, 2004), "Returning to Moral 'First Things': The Natural Law Tradition and Its Contemporary Application," J. Daryl Charles made the following provocative statement:

Natural serves as a bridge between Christian and non-Christian morality. In civil society, religious and nonreligious people conform to the same ethical standard in order to be governable. A revival in natural-law thinking, therefore must be a highest priority for the Christian Community as we content in, rather than abdicate, the public square.

Why do I describe this statement as provocative? Two reasons: First, while Roman Catholics have traditionally embraced natural law theology, Protestants have been far more suspicious about certain elements of it with some even outright denying its viability for ethics (i.e., Karl Barth). Second, great skepticism exists among an increasingly Postmodern society that questions not only the existence of natural law, but even the most fundamental structures of reasoning by which, if it were real, it could be accessed.

Therefore, if Charles is correct in his claim that a revival in natural-law thinking "must take place" to build a bridge, then at least two things have to be addressed if there is to be a hope of actually building that bridge. First, Catholic and Protestant Christians must identify points of common ground to serve as a basic foundation upon which they can agree and constructively move forward. Second, Christians in general must demonstrate why and how natural law theory is vitally necessary for personal and public life in an increasingly Postmodern era. My intention in this paper is to offer some thoughts on each.

Abstract: Apologetics is the art and science of defending the Christian faith. Thus, this paper will discuss both (a) much-needed attitudes that apologists should cultivate and (b) helpful approaches and strategies for Christian apologetics. Some of these points will (should!) be self-evident to the apologist - a gracious, loving demeanor; a listening ear; a spirit can discern between smokescreens and true "seeker" questions. In terms of strategies, the paper offers advice regarding potentially contentious issues such as inerrancy, creation vs. evolution, the burden of proof, and the role of natural theology (thin vs. thick theism), and so forth.

Abstract: In his book, God's Call: Moral Realism, God's Commands, and Human Autonomy, John Hare argues that natural law fails to adequately and accurately capture the moral furniture of the world as a metaethical theory, rather opting for a version of divine command theory commensurate with Duns Scotus. In this paper, I wish to argue that Hare's defense of divine command theory is problematical on two levels. First, as a theistic metaethical theory, Hare fails to give a satisfactory theological justification for his position. Second, his construal of divine command theory as the ground for moral obligation does not adequately account for some of our strongest moral intuitions and judgments. Both of these deficiencies, I argue, are better accounted for by a natural law theory.

Abstract: It is often the case that arguments for the existence of God are branded with the label, "God of the Gaps Arguments." In this essay, I explore what this charge amounts to and whether it must apply to any argument for a supernatural being. My aim is to offer some ways to develop some plausible principles to sort out when theistic arguments ought to be abandoned because of this charge and when they ought not be abandoned.

Abstract: In recent years, people have finally begun to appreciate C. S. Lewis the philosopher. However, Lewis’s entire journey to Christianity was deeply philosophical, having moved through seven or eight unique philosophical phases before his eventual Christian conversion. In this paper, Adam Barkman focuses on the least known of these phases – Lewis’s pseudo-Manichean phase, which took place between the years 1917-1919.